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Public opinion, whatever it could be, 
is extremely powerful. It can overthrow governments, 
even an undemocratic regime.
Karl R. Popper1
Abstract: This article focuses on the influence of investigative journalism on the system of govern-
ment, and, in particular, on the functioning and break-up of cabinet coalitions in Poland after 1989. It 
focuses on the parliamentary-cabinet form of government. The source of conflicts which led to the loss 
of the necessary trust or accelerated the fall of the government were often crises caused by the work 
of investigative journalists, in which they disclosed facts uncomfortable for members of the Council 
of Ministers, related to them either directly, through their own reprehensible activities, or indirectly, 
through the activities of their closest associates. The aim of this article is to show that the unmasking of 
scandals involving members of the government, their associates or politicians and officials from their 
political base is a catalyst that can generate cabinet crises, including the collapse of the government. 
Analyses show the impact of scandals revealed during the term of office of four governments, that of 
Waldemar Pawlak, Leszek Miller, Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Tusk.
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Investigative journalism is the most frequently quoted example in literature of the mass media carrying out its ‘watchdog’ function towards the world of politics, public au-
thorities, bureaucrats and businesses. Many researchers treat this form of reporters’ work 
as a synonym of the ‘fourth estate,’ able to influence not only the minds of the public, 
but also to effectively shape the actions of politicians. As an important element of politi-
cal communication and political journalism, so-called ‘muckraking’ plays a key role in 
monitoring the activities of authorities, offices, public institutions and politicians. The 
essence of the role of an investigative journalist is to reveal and publish all manifes-
tations of wrongdoing within an institution, as well as social problems which present 
a serious threat to the proper functioning of the political system. This type of media 
activity also influences public opinion, which exerts pressure on the institution, as well 
as the political system, and, in certain cases, can lead to real changes. As Karl P. Popper 
claimed, there are two types of institutions; those in which the public is grounded inside 
1 K. R. Popper (1994), Opinia publiczna w świetle zasad liberalizmu, “Studia Polityczne,” no. 3, 
p. 12.
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the institution, or those with the public outside. He placed the mass media in the first of 
these groups, alongside political parties, societies, universities, the theater or the cinema 
(Popper, 1994, p. 12). Personnel, legislative and administrative decisions are often the 
result of a combination of political events initiated by the results of journalistic investiga-
tions published in the press. Political crises can occur as the result of ‘unmaskings,’ often 
after a short-term political crisis, which can lead to changes, even far-reaching systemic 
reforms such as amending the constitution or a piece of legislation. In situations such as 
these, social interests are protected, while the image of public institutions and politicians 
is negatively impacted. However, the benefits for the system and society prevail over 
the damage caused by the publication of articles unmasking improper behavior. Thus, in 
a democratic regime, the free press performs the important function of informally con-
trolling the three types of power (as described by Montesquieu). Alexis de Tocqueville 
puts it well: “I approve of it from a consideration more of the evils it prevents than of the 
advantages it ensures” (Tocqueville, 1976, p. 134).
The focus of this article is the influence of investigative journalism on the govern-
ment, and in particular on the functioning and break-up of cabinet coalitions in Poland 
after 1989. This connection seems obvious, and is directly related to the effectiveness of 
the parliamentary-cabinet form of government. The essence of this method of govern-
ment is the creation of a cabinet with the support of the parliamentary majority, which 
grants it legitimacy by a vote of confidence. Multi-party parliamentary support in the 
Sejm is the dominant model in Poland, the only exception being the current parliament, 
although even in this case it is not entirely true, because the parliamentary caucus under 
the name United Right (Zjednoczona Prawica) is in fact a coalition of three parties: 
Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), Solidarity of Poland (Solidarna Polska) and 
Poland Together (Polska Razem). Coalitions comprising large numbers of political par-
ties are usually not stable. The divergence of interests and expectations of partners in 
political coalition causes major problems in the implementation of the program agreed 
in the coalition agreement, which can be, paradoxically, the reason for the collapse of the 
government, sometimes even resulting in a motion of censure against its own Council of 
Ministers (this happened twice in the case of the rule of Hanna Suchocka and Waldemar 
Pawlak) (Jednaka, 2006, pp. 117–132; Sokół, 2006, pp. 133–158). The source of con-
flicts leading to the loss of necessary trust or accelerating the fall of the government were 
often crises caused by the work of investigative journalists, in which they disclosed facts 
uncomfortable for members of the Council of Ministers, related to them either directly, 
due to their own reprehensible activities, or indirectly, due to the activities of their clos-
est associates.
The aim of the article is to show that investigative journalists’ unmasking of scandals 
involving members of the government, their closest associates or politicians and officials 
belonging to their political base can act as a catalyst that generates cabinet crises, includ-
ing the collapse of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, investigative publications can be 
considered very important, although the scandals that they generate are usually only one 
of several reasons for the weakening or collapse of the government. The author’s aim is 
to answer several research questions related to the aforementioned issues: What subject 
of investigative journalism effectively affects the decision-making processes leading to 
cabinet crises and possible change of government? Is it possible to show a correlation 
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between the number of parties forming the cabinet coalition and the effectiveness of the 
press in influencing the government’s activity by publishing scandals? Is the generation 
of scandals related to the Council of Ministers by journalists a reliable method of control 
over the executive? Or is it part of the political struggle in which the media is used by the 
opposition? These topics are discussed in the context of selected examples of four cabi-
net coalitions, in chronological order: that of Waldemar Pawlak, Leszek Miller, Jarosław 
Kaczyński and Donald Tusk. In the analysis of individual cases, microsystem analysis 
and the decision method were used. The first of these methods enabled the identification 
of links between the activity of investigative journalists and the actions of decision-mak-
ers in the political system, as well as an assessment of the level of journalism’s influence 
on the conduct of the authorities. The decision method, on the other hand, was helpful in 
the analysis of processes related to key (mainly personal) decisions caused by investiga-
tive publications (Chodubski, 1996, pp. 75–81).
* * *
The issue of political crises is relevant to various social sciences – political science, 
sociology, and economics (Dobry, 1995; Dahrendorf, 2008; Małkiewicz, 2010; Wielecki, 
2012; Soroka, 2013; Rychard, Domański, 2010; Jaskiernia, 2013). Many are of the opinion 
that this term is often abused and used in various contexts. Sometimes even an economic 
slowdown is named a crisis (Małkiewicz, 2010, p. 11). The etymology of the concept 
– and thus its meaning – has been described in various ways. Agnieszka Kasińska-Metryka 
points to the French origin of the term “crisis” from the word “crise,” which means a dif-
ficult situation with no clear solution (Kasińska-Metryka, 2013, p. 77). The authors of the 
Lexicon of Politology, however, see the root of this concept in Latin (crisis) and in Greek 
(krisis), in which the term is synonymous with a crisis, a breakthrough, a decision (Her-
but, 1998, pp. 183–184). ‘Crisis’ can thus be understood as: (1) the collapse of a given 
system; (2) an interruption of the normal functioning of an institution; or (3) a sudden turn 
of events. The characteristics of this type of situation are suddenness, unpredictability, the 
temporal nature of its occurrence and far-reaching consequences for the functioning of the 
system (Bankowicz, 1999, pp. 119–120). A crisis may eventually make it impossible for 
an institution concerned to continue functioning. The consequence of such a breakthrough 
is sometimes a complete change in policy or the way in which it is implemented (Herbut, 
1998, pp. 183–184). It is worth emphasizing the positive role of such crises in politics, 
which can lead to the initiation of reforms which would otherwise be difficult to imple-
ment. Among the various forms of crises, two are crucial for the purposes of this article 
– the cabinet crisis and the parliamentary crisis. Both are crucial for the government, which 
requires stable and long-lasting support in the parliament. The term ‘cabinet crisis’ means 
“the collapse of the government and the opening of the bidding phase and inter-party ne-
gotiations aimed at installing a new team,” and ‘parliamentary crisis’ should be understood 
as “the loss of a comfortable majority by the ruling party or the parliamentary coalition, 
which compromises their ability to continue their current policy agenda” (Herbut, 1998, 
pp. 183–184). The phenomenon of the crisis in politics is also important for media stud-
ies, in particular the study of the effectiveness of investigative journalism (Olędzki, 1989; 
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Adamczyk, 2007; idem, 2008, pp. 66–100; Feldstein, 2001; idem, 2006, pp. 105–120; 
Molotch, Protess, Gordon, 1996; Orren, 1991; Linsky, 1991; Taras, 1993; Protess, Cook, 
Doppelt, Ettema, Gordon, Leff, Miller, 1991; Baybars-Hawks, 2003; Meyer, Hinchman, 
2004). These analyses focus primarily on the causative role of the mass media in triggering 
crisis situations in institutions of power. Considerations regarding the model of muckrak-
ing (also called a model of mobilization, universal mobilization or defense of society), 
along with its numerous modifications, sub-divided into the truncated muckraking model 
and the leaping impact model are also helpful in understanding the possible impacts of 
investigative journalism on the world of politics. This assumes that the content of investi-
gative report evokes a reaction in the recipients of the new information revealed, as a result 
of which public opinion becomes a catalyst for appropriate reforms (Molotch, Protess, 
Gordon, 1996, pp. 44–50).
Graph 1. Muckraking model
Source: Own study.
The powerful role of investigative publications in triggering major crises within the 
executive has been repeatedly analyzed, in particular regarding the best known cases and 
those which led to changes in key positions. These include the Pentagon Papers and Wa-
tergate scandals, which, after being published in “The New York Times” and the “Wash-
ington Post” dailies led to the resignation of the President for the first time in US history 
(Adamczyk, 2008, pp. 85–100). In Europe, the first such high-profile cases in which the 
power of investigative journalism over the executive was demonstrated were the Pro-
fumo scandal in the United Kingdom and events in Germany known as the Spiegel affair. 
In the first of these cases, journalists published not only the extramarital affairs of the 
Defense Minister in Her Majesty’s government, John Profumo, but also the associated 
risk of treason in the form of passing information to foreign intelligence,2 and his lies in 
2 It was only fifty years after the outbreak of the scandal that Christine Keeler admitted that she had 
betrayed Britain and forwarded information obtained from Minister J. Profumo to Soviet intelligence 
agent Yevgeni Ivanov (Millward, 2013).
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the House of Commons. This led first to the resignation of Profumo, and then to a cabi-
net crisis and the collapse of Harold Macmillan’s government in October 1963 (Burgh, 
2000, p. 286; Gaster, 1988, pp. 62–88; Thompson, 2000, p. 131–137; Parris, Maguire, 
2004, pp. 156–181). In the second scandal, the series of events triggered by articles 
published in the weekly “Der Spiegel” on the combat readiness of the Bundeswehr after 
NATO military maneuvers under the code name “Falex 62” led first to a parliamentary 
crisis which resulted in the exit of one of the parties forming the governing coalition, the 
FDP, from the government. However, public pressure was so strong that it also forced the 
resignation of Minister of Defense Franz Josef Strauss who, in the opinion of the Pros-
ecutor General in the lawsuit brought against the weekly, its editors and the author of the 
publication, acted in a way that was “bordering on illegal” (Kuntz, 1988, pp. 151–154). 
The dismissals of several ministers from the FDP in November 1962 triggered a cabinet 
crisis and forced Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to form a new government.
It should be emphasized that investigative journalism serves to make the public aware 
of the politically and morally reprehensible behavior of politicians. The reporters and the 
media exercise this form of control primarily by revealing and publicizing cases of inap-
propriate actions by institutions of power and making the behind-the-scenes activities 
of the political elite public knowledge. Projects of this type can lead to the disclosure of 
legal loopholes and other systemic problems which enable corrupt politicians and offi-
cials to carry out extralegal activities in order to achieve particular goals. Making public 
the existence of a “systemic fault” is to stimulate public opinion to put pressure on the 
political elite and, consequently, reform the activities of political institutions. Initiating 
these processes in institutions of power has a multifaceted nature. Some may lead to 
major legislative changes, others to the removal of corrupt politicians and officials from 
positions of authority. This demonstrates the important role of the mass communication 
system, along with interpersonal communication, in the system of making political deci-
sions (Kepplinger, 2003, p. 79). Journalists pay special attention to the abuse of power, 
transgressions by public officials and also to various types of blunders made by people in 
power. In practice, this means monitoring the activities of the political elite, in particular 
those carried out in secret. The confidential nature of these activities, in many cases, 
is driven by the desire to hide unlawful behavior from public opinion, and by the fear 
of possible sanctions (Blumler, Gurevitch, 1995, pp. 27–29). Contemporary democratic 
political regimes, accepting the central role of the mass media in shaping public opin-
ion, recognize the right of journalists to uphold the rule of law, to determine the leading 
themes of public debate and exercise control over those in power (Sartori, 1998, p. 124). 
The disclosure of scandals involving politicians has the greatest impact on the resources 
most necessary for governance – reputation and trust. A scandalous public image, in 
which reprehensible actions are discovered by investigative journalists, leads to social 
disapproval and sanctions. Scandal in this context is a means to achieve this end, not an 
end in itself. Its essence is to attract attention and mobilize public opinion to put pres-
sure on the institutions of the political system, which should result in political initiatives 
and, consequently, decisions aimed at restoring harmony. From this perspective, public 
opinion becomes a catalyst for the necessary reforms (Molotch, Protess, Gordon, 1996, 
pp. 44–50). The effects of journalistic investigations observed in the public sphere are: 
specific reactions of public figures to the issues revealed and publicized by the mass 
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media, leading to discussion and the search for solutions (consultative results); sanc-
tions imposed by policy-makers on specific persons or entities responsible for allegedly 
inappropriate or unlawful behavior (individual results); and changes of a legislative, ad-
ministrative or control nature (actual reforms) (Baybars-Hawks, 2003). Another effect of 
publications triggering political scandals are new legal regulations and the introduction 
of institutional solutions to investigate irregularities in the actions of people in power 
(Thompson, 2000, p. 114). Put simply, it can be concluded that the mass media have 
a causative and causal role in the political system, which can be summed up in the state-
ment: “mass communication changes policy” (Schulz, 2006, p. 14).
The issue of the impact of investigative journalism on causing cabinet crises in Po-
land will be discussed based on the example of four governments (Graph 2).
Graph 2. Scandals disclosed by investigative journalists in selected governments of the Third 
Polish Republic
Source: Own study.
The specificity of the Polish political system, and in particular of the party system, 
is a useful subject of analysis in this regard. It has been established that “the more the 
party system deviates from bipartisan, the weaker the government’s position towards 
the parliament, and the more likely cabinet crises are. This is particularly important in 
Central and Eastern Europe, where party systems are still taking shape, and the political 
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scene is both fragmented (with the exception of Albania, Hungary and the Czech Repub-
lic) and unstable” (Antoszewski, Herbut, 2007, p. 172). When assessing the durability 
of governments, one should take into account the number of political parties, the size 
of the party system, the presence of anti-system parties or other extreme parties which 
have a destabilizing effect on the duration of the cabinet, the degree of polarization or 
conflicts related to socio-political divisions and the degree of influence of the opposition 
in politics (Jednaka, 2004, pp. 53–54). Many reasons for the fall of governments have 
been described in the literature on the subject. The so-called technical reasons include: 
regular elections, death or resignation of the Prime Minister and constitutional reasons 
for the end of the cabinet’s term in office. Among the discretionary reasons for the fall 
of the government, the following have been mentioned: dissolution of the parliament, 
voluntary extension of the coalition with new political parties, parliamentary failure as 
a result of opposition activities and conflict between parties or inside the party. Addi-
tional catalysts for the resignation of the Cabinet may include personnel, economic, in-
ternational or national events in the field of security, non-parliamentary events or public 
opinion (Jednaka, 2004, pp. 67–68; Strøm, Müller, 2000, p. 585).
The coalition government of Waldemar Pawlak (November 10, 1993–March 01, 
1995) had the parliamentary support of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the 
Polish People’s Party (PSL). The two parties formed a coalition with a small majority. 
Despite a stable parliamentary base, the sustainability of multi-party governments was 
repeatedly tested. The most serious areas of contention between coalition partners in-
cluded personnel, agricultural policy, the manner of conducting privatization, foreign 
policy towards the European Union and Prime Minister Pawlak’s style of governing, 
which is particularly important in the context of the discussed issue of the influence 
of journalistic investigations on cabinet crises. Pawlak was criticized, among other 
things, for delays in decision-making, surprising political partners with unexpected 
changes to previously agreed solutions and a lack of coordination between the gov-
ernment and other authorities. These weaknesses were exploited by the opposition 
press, which publicized conflicts within the coalition and sought to split the two ruling 
parties (Sokół, 2006, pp. 154–155). Investigative journalists revealed two scandals. 
On March 4, 1994, Express Wieczorny accused Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak of 
helping his former university classmate, Paweł Zdunek, the owner of the InterAms 
computer company, to obtain large orders from state-owned companies. Eight months 
later, on November 20, 1994, the weekly Wprost published an article entitled “Femme 
fatale of the Prime Minister,” which claimed that InterAms owes its success to, inter 
alia, the fact that it employed the ‘supersecretary’ Anna M., with whom Pawlak had an 
extramarital affair (Mistewicz, Witoszek, 1994; Adamczyk, 1999, pp. 146–147; Bereś, 
2000, pp. 221–224). On November 28, 1994, the Regional Court in Warsaw declared 
the bankruptcy of InterAms II. The parties in this case were the company Supra from 
Poznań and the owner of InterAms II, Paweł Zdunek. At the beginning of December, 
the Office of the Regional Prosecutor in Warsaw initiated an investigation into the 
InterAms II company, and a few days later the Supreme Audit Office started to assess 
the Office of the Council of Ministers. It was tasked with explaining why the Office of 
the Council of Ministers (URM) chose InterAms without a public tender and whether 
this was an attempt to rescue a failing company. On March 1, 1995, Prime Minister 
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Pawlak resigned, due both to conflicts in the coalition and to accusations against his 
government in the InterAms case.
Leszek Miller’s government (October 19, 2001–May 2, 2004) was created by three 
political parties: SLD, PSL and Labor United (UP), forming a coalition with a small 
majority (Sokół, 2006a, p. 24). In this configuration, it survived until March 3, 2003, 
when the PSL left and the remaining parties ruled as a minority government. Among 
the important problems for Miller’s cabinet was the issue of the so-called Hausner Plan, 
which divided the UP from the rest of the coalition. As in the case of Pawlak, Prime 
Minister Miller was criticized for his style of governing, both his way of managing the 
Council of Ministers and the party. In the latter case, the main challenge was combining 
the leadership of a political party with the position of the head of government (Michalak, 
Wincławska, 2006, pp. 253–254). The negative impact on the image of the Cabinet, and 
hence declining public support, as measured by subsequent public opinion polls, was 
also connected to scandals publicized by the media. Chronologically, the first scandal to 
be revealed was the issue of the corrupt proposal submitted by the film producer, Lew 
Rywin, to the management of Agora and to the Editor-in-Chief of “Gazeta Wyborcza”. 
The matter was referred to in the weekly “Wprost” in September 2002 in the column 
“From the life of the coalition, from the life of the opposition,” a column which is in-
tended to have a light-hearted tone. The content of the proposed agreement focused on 
the government’s changes to the regulations on radio and television that would enable 
Agora to purchase one of the national television channels. In exchange, Rywin, who 
claimed to be an informal adviser to Prime Minister Miller, was to demand for himself 
the position of the head of Polsat television and the amount of 17.5 million dollars, 
which was to be transferred to the producer’s account (Zalewska, 2003, pp. 251–294). 
On December 27, 2002, “Gazeta Wyborcza” published an article by Paweł Smoleński 
entitled “Act for a Bribe, or Rywin comes to Michnik,” revealing the involvement of 
Rywin in the corrupt proposal. The opposition took advantage of the public outrage. On 
January 10, 2003, the Sejm, at the request of the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic 
Platform (PO) parliamentary caucuses, set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the 
allegations, published in the media, of corruption related to the Radio and Television 
Act. Three days later, the “Rzeczpospolita” daily published the first results of its own 
investigation into this case (Majewski, Marszałek, Zalewska, 2003). The commission of 
inquiry commenced on April 5, 2004. Despite preliminary support for the committee’s 
version of the report prepared by MP Anita Błochowiak, questioning the existence of the 
mythical ‘group holding power,’ the decision of the Sejm, taken on September 24, 2004, 
was the final report prepared by MP Zbigniew Ziobro. This document was radical in its 
proposals, among others demanding that the Prime Minister and President Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski appear before the Tribunal of State (Resolution, 2004). On December 10, 
2004, the trial of Lew Rywin was concluded. He was legally recognized as an intermedi-
ary for people who wanted to submit a corrupt offer to Agora. The court sentenced him 
to 2 years in prison and a fine of PLN 100,000 (Gędek, 2015, pp. 116–118).
The second scandal publicized by the media was the ‘Starachowice scandal.’ In July 
2003, “Rzeczpospolita” daily revealed that Andrzej Jagiełło, an MP for the SLD, had 
warned his party colleague and the governor of Starachowice about an action planned 
by the Central Investigation Bureau (CBŚ) against members of the gang who cooper-
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ated with local government officials, in a phone conversation in March of the same year. 
According to the newspaper’s findings, Jagiełło was planning to leak information from 
Zbigniew Sobotka, deputy head of the Ministry of Interior and Administration. To estab-
lish the facts, it was necessary to analyze the transcripts obtained by eavesdropping on 
the governor’s phone during the preparations for the action. CBŚ arrested several SLD 
local government officials. Shortly afterwards, prosecution charges were brought against 
two SLD deputies – Jagiełło and Henryk Długosz, who mediated in the exchange of in-
formation between Sobotka and Jagiełło. In 2005, the District Court in Kielce sentenced 
Sobotka to 3.5 years, Henryk Długosz to two years, and Andrzej Jagiełło to 1.5 years in 
prison (Werner, 2013). Both of the above-mentioned scandals contributed to the collapse 
of the government. On May 2, 2004, Prime Minister Miller handed in his resignation, 
along with the entire Council of Ministers.
The next case is the government headed by Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, al-
though in this case one should talk rather about three Cabinets. The first was in power 
from July 19, 2006 until September 22, 2006 and was supported by three parties – Law 
and Justice, Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona RP) and the League 
of Polish Families (LPR). The next Cabinet, without Samoobrona RP, operated from 
September 22, 2006 until October 16, 2006. The third government, again with the sup-
port of Samoobrona RP, governed from October 16, 2006 until August 13, 2007 (Banaś, 
Lechowicz, 2015, pp. 16–17). The main problems of the cabinets headed by Jarosław 
Kaczyński were maintaining the coherence of the parliamentary base and dealing with 
image problems resulting from scandals published by the media about parliamentar-
ians from the ruling parties. In September 2006, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Agriculture Andrzej Lepper was dismissed for criticizing budget proposals. This meant 
weakening the parliamentary base, as members of Samoobrona RP subsequently left the 
coalition. However, after less than a month, the party returned to the governing coali-
tion. This happened four days before a broadcast entitled “Now WE!” (Teraz MY) was 
aired on the TV channel TVN. In this broadcast, news that compromised important PiS 
MPs appeared on recorded video tapes, which began the so-called ‘tape scandal.’ On 
the recordings, recorded with a hidden camera, the head of the Prime Minister’s Of-
fice, Adam Lipiński, urged a member of Samoobrona RP, MP Renata Beger, along with 
several other Samoobrona RP MPs, to defect to PiS. In return, the minister offered legal 
assistance to avoid paying off promissory notes with the possibility of using the Sejm’s 
financial resources to fund this, and to have the bailiff called off (these promissory notes 
were created in order to act as a guarantee in the event that Samoobrona RP MPs left 
the party during the parliamentary term). The second of the recorded MPs was Wojciech 
Mojzesowicz, who resigned from the post of Secretary of State in the Office of the Prime 
Minister on October 26, 2006 (in July the following year he returned to the government 
as Minister of Agriculture). In March 2007, the prosecutor’s office discontinued the pro-
ceedings regarding the tape scandal (Tyrała, 2014, p. 117; PAP, 2014).
The next government crisis was related to the so-called ‘sexafera’ (sex scandal). On 
December 4, 2006, “Gazeta Wyborcza” published an article entitled Work for sex (Praca 
za seks) by Marcin Kącki, revealing illicit practices in the Samoobrona RP party, with the 
participation of prominent activists, in relation to Aneta Krawczyk, a female party activist 
from the province of Łódź. A day later, in the “Teraz My” program on TVN, Krawczyk 
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said that Stanisław Łyżwiński of Samoobrona RP was the father of her three and a half-
year-old daughter, and that his assistant had tried to force her to take an abortion pill (later 
DNA tests proved that Łyżwiński was in fact not the father). On December 14, Łyżwiński 
was expelled from the party, and on August 23, 2007, the Sejm denied him parliamentary 
immunity and thus consented to his arrest. The next day, the prosecutor’s office charged 
Łyżwiński with seven charges, including offering Krawczyk a job in exchange for sexual 
favors, forcing her and two other women to perform sexual favors, and rape of the district 
councilor. On November 8, 2007, charges were also leveled against Andrzej Lepper, the 
leader of Samoobrona RP, including demanding and accepting sexual favors from Aneta 
Krawczyk. In the years 2008–2011, courts convicted several activists of this party in con-
nection with this case, including Łyżwiński and Lepper.
The third of the scandals, known as the ‘land scandal,’ became a catalyst for the col-
lapse of Jarosław Kaczyński’s government. On July 9, 2007, the Minister of Agriculture 
and the Deputy Prime Minister, Andrzej Lepper, was dismissed from his position in 
connection with the suspicion that he could have personally benefited from land de-
preciation. The CBA attempted a provocation handing him a bribe, but they failed. The 
reason for the failure was a leak, for which the prosecutor’s office suspected the head 
of the Ministry of Interior and Administration, Janusz Kaczmarek, was responsible (on 
August 8, 2007 he was removed from office). Among those suspected of warning Lepper 
were the Chief Commander of the Police, Konrad Kornatowski, businessman Ryszard 
Krauze and an MP for Samoobrona RP, Lech Woszczerowicz. However, the investiga-
tion in this case was discontinued. On August 9, 2007, Jarosław Marzec was dismissed 
by Kaczyński from the post of Central Commandant of the Office of Investigation (he 
was to be a source of leaks to the head of the Ministry of Interior and Administration). 
Two days later, the Prime Minister broke the coalition agreement and dismissed minis-
ters from the LPR and Samoobrona RP. On August 23, 2007, PiS filed for the dissolution 
of the Sejm, which was a consequence of the crisis in the ruling coalition. On Septem-
ber 7, 2007, MPs decided to dissolve the Sejm. Formally, the ‘polite’ dismissal of the 
Cabinet took place on November 5.
Donald Tusk twice became the head of the government after parliamentary elections 
won by his party. The first cabinet formed by PO with PSL support was in office from 
November 24, 2007 until November 8, 2011, and the second, also in coalition with the 
PSL, ruled from November 21, 2011 until September 11, 2014. The first cabinet had to 
face the consequences of the global financial crisis at the beginning of their term of of-
fice, which forced the government to implement a restrictive budget policy, in particular 
in the area of social spending. The opposition also accused the ruling coalition of exces-
sively increasing the state’s debt. The Cabinet’s image was adversely affected by the de-
cision to raise the retirement age for women and men and to transfer to the Social Insur-
ance Institution (ZUS) savings held in the second pillar (OFE) worth PLN 152.8 billion 
in 2013. The scandals published by the media were of considerable importance for the 
coalition and the image of the government. Chronologically, the first was the so-called 
‘gambling scandal,’ revealed on October 1, 2009 by “Rzeczpospolita” (Gmyz, Zawadka, 
2009). Politicians from the largest coalition party were involved: the head of the PO 
caucus, Zbigniew Chlebowski, and the Minister of Sport, Mirosław Drzewiecki. In the 
article, journalists accused them of lobbying for gambling companies. Referring to the 
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findings of the investigation under the name “Black Jack,” conducted since March 23, 
2009 by the Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA), “Rzeczpospolita” reporters pointed 
to two businessmen from the gambling industry, from Lower Silesia – Ryszard Sobie-
siak and Jan Koska – who tried to push amendments to the Gambling Act that were 
beneficial for their companies. Thanks to eavesdropping on telephone conversations, it 
was established that, at that time, these entrepreneurs had contacted Chlebowski, who 
headed the Sejm Public Finance Committee, and Drzewiecki, the head of the Ministry 
of Sport, many times. That office was responsible for preparations for Euro 2012 in Po-
land. The co-financing of this event came from money obtained from additional taxes 
(called a surcharge) imposed on gambling companies. This was expected to raise PLN 
469 million for the budget. PO politicians declared that they wished to remove the sur-
charge on gambling companies from the text of the Act. On June 30, 2009, Drzewiecki, 
in a letter to the Minister of Finance, asked for the surcharge to be removed from the 
bill, considering their introduction to be “pointless,” and applied for “exclusion from 
further proceedings.” On August 12, 2009, the Commander of the Central Anticorrup-
tion Bureau informed Prime Minister Tusk of the findings of the investigation. Shortly 
afterwards, contacts between the businessmen and the politicians ceased, and the CBA 
informed the Prime Minister of this on September 12, suggesting a leak. On September 
18, President Lech Kaczyński was informed about the case. On October 1, 2009, Chle-
bowski was suspended as the head of the PO parliamentary caucus and announced his 
resignation as the head of the Public Finance Commission. Four days later, Drzewiecki 
also resigned. There were more personal consequences related to this scandal. Grzegorz 
Schetyna, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior and Administration (he 
became the new chairman of the PO caucus), the Minister of Justice, Andrzej Czuma, 
and the Deputy Minister of the Economy, Adam Szejnfeld, left the government. Paweł 
Graś, Sławomir Nowak and Rafał Grupiński concluded their work for the Chancellery of 
the Prime Minister (the decisions was later revoked in the case of Graś). On October 13, 
Prime Minister Tusk dismissed Mariusz Kamiński, considering that, in the matter of the 
‘gambling scandal,’ he “used the CBA against political competitors” (Święczkowski, 
Ziaja, 2014, pp. 99–121; PAP, 2011).
An even more serious image crisis for the next cabinet of PM Tusk was the so-
called ‘eavesdropping scandal.’ On June 14, 2014, fragments of illegal recordings of two 
eavesdropped conversations in the restaurants Sowa & Przyjaciele and Amber Room 
were revealed on the website of the weekly “Wprost”. On June 16, transcripts from the 
recordings were published in the paper edition of the weekly. Among the recorded was 
the President of the National Bank of Poland and ministers from Tusk’s government. 
On June 18, 2014, the prosecutor’s office and the Internal Security Agency (ABW) con-
ducted a search in the editorial office of “Wprost” to obtain media containing recordings 
of the eavesdropped conversations. On June 22, 2014, the other media began to reveal 
fragments of the recordings of next conversations between politicians, and a day later 
“Wprost” published detailed transcripts of these eavesdropped conversations. Under 
pressure from the opposition demanding the resignation of discredited politicians and 
officials, on June 25, 2014, Tusk submitted a motion to request a vote of confidence 
in the Sejm. In the vote, 237 MPs supported the cabinet, 203 were against. However, 
this did not stop the opposition. The next day, the PiS parliamentary caucus filed a mo-
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tion for a constructive vote of no confidence in the government of Donald Tusk (the 
candidate for Prime Minister was Professor Piotr Gliński). On July 11, 2014, the Sejm 
rejected the motions for no confidence votes against the government and the Minister of 
Internal Affairs. The consequence of the disclosure of the eavesdropped conversations, 
apart from obvious image problems and decrease in confidence in Tusk’s government, 
was the resignation in September 2014 of Tusk, who became President of the European 
Council in December. The next cabinet was headed by Ewa Kopacz. On June 10, 2015, 
the Ministers of Health, Sport, Tourism and the State Treasury, three deputy ministers, 
Special Services Coordinator and the head of the Political Advisers’ Team of the Prime 
Minister also resigned. Radosław Sikorski resigned from the role of the Sejm Speaker 
(Latkowski, Majewski, 2014; Wilgocki, 2015).
The analysis of the discussed scandals in four governments proves that, as a result of 
revelations by journalists, image problems, frictions within coalitions, declining public 
confidence, dismissals and ultimately the collapse of cabinets are not directly linked to 
the specific subject matter in press publications. The scandals described in the media 
concerned a wide range of issues, ranging from corruption, nepotism and sexual ex-
ploitation to the embarrassingly low level of illegally overheard conversations between 
important politicians. Therefore, there is no rule in this area that would indicate the main 
reason for the emergence of cabinet crises or affecting their severity. A similar conclu-
sion can be reached by analyzing the correlation between the number of parties forming 
a cabinet coalition and the effectiveness of influencing the government via the media. 
Of the four described cases, only Miller and Kaczyński had coalitions formed of three 
political parties, whereas the governments of Pawlak and Tusk were supported by only 
two parties. Regardless of the number of parties supporting the policy of the Council of 
Ministers, the scandals revealed by investigative journalists have had similar effects. It 
is difficult to see the direct influence of the number of coalition partners on the number 
of scandals and government crises they generate. The only noticeable feature of the 
cabinets with parliamentary support consisting of two parties is their greater determina-
tion in the struggle to survive the crisis and stay in power, also expressed in the visible 
consolidation of the parliamentary base. In the case of cabinet coalitions supported by 
three parties, with differing numbers of seats in the parliament and led by a Prime Min-
ister with a strong personality (such as Kaczyński), media scandals can quickly lead 
to the disintegration of the ruling system, though not necessarily the downfall of the 
Council of Ministers itself. In all the discussed scandals, the source of exposure was 
the opposition media. This is of course nothing extraordinary in the context of the con-
trol function exercised by the press, which should make journalists independent of the 
government, irrespective of who is at the helm. Only in this way can the ‘fourth estate’ 
fulfill its obligations to the public. However, it is impossible not to notice the significant 
involvement of the media in favoring specific political groups and publicizing scandals 
which make it more difficult for their competitors to govern. This is evidenced by the 
InterAms scandal (“Wprost”), Rywin scandal (“Gazeta Wyborcza”), tape scandal (TVN 
and “Gazeta Wyborcza”), sex scandal (“Gazeta Wyborcza”), and eavesdropping scandal 
(“Wprost”). In these cases, investigative publications were used in the political struggle, 
and the media themselves were treated by the opposition as an instrument to weaken 
their opponents.
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The described examples of investigative journalism indicate that their publication 
has a significant impact on the stability of cabinet coalitions in Poland. The disclosed 
scandals reduced public support for the government and increased the visibility of their 
actions, thus revealing the weaknesses of both the political parties themselves and the 
institutions they represent, as well as individual politicians or high-level officials. In 
this way, the media have the power to deprive governments of the necessary public 
support and trust that they need to retain power. Although the investigative publications 
themselves are rarely the only factor in the government’s collapse, they can certainly be 
considered as a catalyst for generating cabinet crises, including the breakdown of the 
Council of Ministers. Negative public opinion caused by such exposures and the pres-
sure exerted on the institutions of power often translates into direct consequences for the 
government, ranging from personal and legislative consequences to the loss of the ability 
to govern effectively.
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Śledztwa dziennikarskie a kryzysy gabinetowe w III RP 
(na wybranych przykładach) 
 
Streszczenie
Przedmiotem rozważań jest wpływ dziennikarstwa śledczego na system rządów, a w szczególności 
na funkcjonowanie i rozpad koalicji gabinetowych w Polsce po 1989 roku. Cezura ta ma bezpośredni 
związek z ukształtowaniem się w ramach transformacji systemowej parlamentarno-gabinetowej formy 
sprawowania rządów. Źródłem konfliktów prowadzących do utraty niezbędnego zaufania lub przy-
spieszających upadek rządu były niejednokrotnie kryzysy wywołane przez publikacje dziennikarzy 
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śledczych, w których ujawniali oni fakty niewygodne dla członków Rady Ministrów, związane bezpo-
średnio z ich nagannymi działaniami lub pośrednio z aktywnością ich najbliższych współpracowników. 
Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że demaskowanie przez reporterów dochodzeniowych afer z udziałem 
członków rządu, ich najbliższych współpracowników lub polityków i urzędników z zaplecza politycz-
nego stanowi swoisty katalizator generujący kryzysy gabinetowe, włącznie z zakończeniem misji Rady 
Ministrów. Analizie poddano wpływ skandali ujawnionych w czasie misji czterech rządów: W. Pawla-
ka, L. Millera, J. Kaczyńskiego i D. Tuska.
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